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SLAVERY, THE RULE OF LAW, AND THE CIVIL WAR

George William Van Cleve*
STEVEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE: RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND SLAVERY ON
TRIAL (Harvard Univ. Press 2010). Pp. 384. Cloth. $29.95.
EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1825-1861 (Univ. Press of
Kan. 2009). Pp. 344. Cloth. $34.95.
EARL M. MALTZ, FUGITIVE SLAVE ON TRIAL: THE ANTHONY BURNS CASE AND
ABOLITIONIST OUTRAGE (Univ. Press of Kan. 2010). Pp. 192. Cloth. $34.95. Paperback.
$17.95.
As the three works of antebellum legal history reviewed here show, the
relationship between slavery, the rule of law, and the Civil War is highly complex and,
even today, politically freighted. Some sense of the difficulty of the issues can be
gleaned from the thought-provoking foreword to Slavery and The Supreme Court, which
begins by discussing Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, and goes on to suggest that
antebellum judges "bore a distinctive responsibility for constitutional evil in antebellum
America."I In such a climate of thought, it is to be expected that each of these books
uses history to create a moral framework in which to judge the actions of lawyers,
judges, and the rule of law itself regarding slavery. This approach follows a long
tradition that - even narrowly defined - dates at least from the classic 1975 work of legal
historian Robert Cover, which broods in the shadows here. 2 This essay discusses the
books and considers what light they shed on the problems of resistance to evil, the rule of
law, and the causes of the Civil War.
Two of the books, Fugitive Slave on Trial3 and Fugitive Justice,4 concern the
antebellum history of the law of fugitive slavery and its implications on the rule of law
and the Civil War. Earl Maltz's Fugitive Slave on Trial, as the author tells us, is really a
history of two trials. The first was the 1854 "trial" (by law, a summary proceeding) of
the alleged fugitive slave Anthony Burns by federal commissioner Edward Loring in
Boston, Massachusetts. The second was the "trial" of Loring who, as a direct result of his
* Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Seattle University School of Law.
1. MARK A. GRABER, Foreword to EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1825-1861 ix,
xii (2009).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:

ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975)

(discussing the history of the law of slavery and its relation to natural law, and analyzing the dilemma faced by
antislavery judges in enforcing laws to which they were morally opposed).
3. EARL M. MALTZ, FUGITIVE SLAVE ON TRIAL: THE ANTHONY BURNS CASE AND ABOLITIONIST
OUTRAGE (2010).
4. STEVEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE: RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND SLAVERY ON TRIAL (2010).
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decision in the Burns case, was removed from his judicial office by the state of
Massachusetts and fired from his teaching post at Harvard Law School. Maltz tells the
story of both trials well. His accounts are balanced, and he is refreshingly candid and
straightforward about his own view of the merits of the Burns case: the decision "was
indisputably correct on the facts and almost certainly justified by existing legal
precedent." 5 Thus, Maltz appears to think there is a reasonable case that Loring should
not have been removed for his Burns decision.6
Maltz's work places the ideal of fidelity to the rule of law in tension with claims
that judges had a duty to resist evil in the case of slavery, especially where the fate of a
fugitive was at stake. He thinks the rule of law should prevail here, even in the context of
what Mark Graber has perceptively called "constitutional evil." 7 Maltz effectively rejects
Cover's legal realist argument that where antebellum slavery was concerned, there was
no ideal, abstract "rule of law," but only an outrageous moral evil that judges failed to
oppose, laboring under a false consciousness that their role required fidelity to what they
deemed to be the rule of law.8
Maltz does a good job of explaining his reasoning. He begins with a brief but
cogent discussion of the political history of the Fugitive Slave Clause, arguing that "it
was the embodiment of a basic premise that underlay the long-term success of any union
between the Northern and Southern states. . . . [It] defined the minimum degree of
tolerance for Southern institutions that the slave states required of Northern states." 9
Maltz's analysis reaches the same result as that reached by many prominent antebellum
judges: the right to recover fugitive slaves was part of the cement of the Union, and
Northern repudiation of that right endangered the Union because it would sharply
heighten sectional tensions. For Maltz, these considerations largely justify Justice Story's
decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania striking down the Pennsylvania "personal liberty"
statute because it conflicted with the Fugitive Slave Clause. 10
However, after 1850 that view was anathema to Massachusetts abolitionists, who
believed that it was immoral even to serve as a federal commissioner in a fugitive slave
case. Many of these abolitionists believed that the evil of the Fugitive Slave law and its
inconsistency with "higher law" relieved them and fugitives of any obligation of
obedience to it, and even authorized forcible resistance to protect and rescue fugitives.
This view had profound effects on their moral judgments. From his pulpit, one
abolitionist leader, Reverend Theodore Parker, charged Commissioner Loring with
"murder" for the violent death of one of Burns's jailers during a mob riot that
unsuccessfully attempted to free Bums while he awaited trial before Loring.
As a
Massachusetts legislative committee report supporting Loring's removal put it, "'[t]he
people ... look on it as sinful and criminal to volunteer [to enforce the Fugitive Slave

5. MALTZ, supra note 3, at 2.
6. See id. at 157-58.
7. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCoTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
8. See COVER, supra note 2, at 1, 6-7, 197-200. Although Cover's work focuses particularly on judges
with "antislavery" views, its analysis can be generally applied.
9. MALTZ, supra note 3, at 6.
10. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 673 (1842).
11. MALTZ, supra note 3, at 69.
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Act].",12 In such circumstances, the principal argument made by Loring's defenders that Loring's removal would compromise judicial independence - was swept aside.
Judges were the people's agents, it was argued, and could not be suffered to act in ways
that offended their moral sensibilities.
Steven Lubet's book, Fugitive Justice, creates quite a different moral framework
than Maltz's text. It centers on three fugitive slavery-related cases: the 1851 treason
prosecution of Castner Hanway stemming from the violent Christiana, Pennsylvania
encounter between fugitive slaves and their citizen supporters on the one hand, and
federal marshals and slaveholders on the other; the 1854 Burns case; and the 1859
prosecutions against Simeon Bushnell and Charles Langston, both accused of helping a
fugitive escape from slaveholders and federal officials in the Western Reserve. Lubet
argues that these "tumultuous trials .. . contributed greatly to the growing discord
between the free and slave states." 1 3 He contends that they strengthened the antislavery
movement in the North, but "outraged public opinion in the South .... [T]he reluctance
of Northerners to comply with the Fugitive Slave Act was frequently cited as a grievance
justifying secession." 1 4 Lubet claims that these cases show "the inability of American
legal and political institutions to come to grips with slavery short of civil war," 15 and
asks, "[h]ow could something so evil be treated so routinely by such otherwise fairminded men?" 1 6
Lubet begins with a brief history of slavery and the Constitution in which he
asserts that "[t]he perpetuation of slavery had been the great moral failing of the
American Revolution of 1776."" He argues that Northerners seeking sectional harmony
at the 1787 Convention essentially allowed slave states to overreach with respect to
fugitive slavery, and that the "newly won 'right to recover slaves,' . . . would eventually
turn slavery into an irresolvable political problem that pitted state against state." 1 8 He
continues by analyzing the progression of the case law on fugitive slavery through Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, which he claims had "startling" implications, because it "suddenly
vested [slave catchers] with extraterritorial rights, essentially allowing them to impose
southern laws on northern states." 1 9 The Supreme Court continued to stand firmly on
"the slaveholders' side" in its 1847 decision in Jones v. Van Zandt,20 rejecting Samuel
Chase's effort to incorporate natural law considerations into the constitutional law debate
over fugitive slavery.21 Lubet also offers a brief analysis of the Compromise of 1850. He
asserts that its most prominent feature was draconian amendments to the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793 that one-sidedly favored slaveholders. This is a strikingly different account
of the legal history of fugitive slavery than the one Maltz provides.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 126.
LUBET, supra note 4, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at IL.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 32.
Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. 215 (1847).
LUBET, supra note 4, at 36.
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Lubet does an excellent job of vividly telling the stories of the three major cases he
considers. He looks carefully at the trial strategies employed by both sides in each case,
and considers the reasons for the behavior of the parties and judges. He suspects that
either or both sides in fugitive slave cases may have used perjured or otherwise
unreliable evidence that they probably knew was flawed. In his view, abolitionist
attorneys thought that the "higher law" would justify their efforts to stretch facts, while
prosecutors seeking to bring members of mobs to justice for violent actions were willing
to stretch facts or law as needed to obtain convictions. Lubet paints a legal framework in
which laws violating due process were the basis for trials where the parties were engaged
in lawless conduct - almost a form of trial by combat - justified by moral claims.
There is no rule of law present in fugitive slave cases, Lubet contends, and little justice
either.
Lubet's discussion of the Bums case offers a sharp contrast to Maltz's account.
Lubet thinks that Burns was "unquestionably" the slave of Richard Suttles, the claimant,
so there was no mistake about Bums's identity.22 However, he thinks that commissioner
Loring could have freed Burns if he had wanted to, because testimony had created a
factual conflict about whether Burns was properly identified. He attacks a key Loring
evidence ruling against Burns as "terribly unfair," although it "may have been a correct
reading of the law at the time," and says that historian Paul Finkelman was correct that
Loring was interested in observing the form but not the substance of justice.23 Lubet
seems to think that Loring's judicial duty was to subvert the fugitive slave laws where
possible; he applauds Burns's attorney Richard Dana's subsequent argument that Loring
could have ruled differently and that, given natural law, he should have done so.24 This
is quite similar to Cover's general argument in JusticeAccused.25
Lubet gives useful attention to the divergent views of antislavery forces, courts,
and federal officials regarding claims that fugitive slavery cases should be decided
according to a "higher law." In this respect, his work complements the broader
perspective on these issues provided by historian Elizabeth Varon's perceptive book,
Disunion.26 He cites federal officials and judges who uniformly believed that failure to
follow positive law would lead to anarchy, mob rule, and civil war; and to this list he
might have added Abraham Lincoln, who had reached this conclusion by 1838.27 Lubet
thinks that antislavery forces rationalized their actions both in- and out-of-court,
including armed violence, assisting fugitive and witness escapes, and the presentation of
flawed evidence, on the basis of a "higher law" that condemned the immorality of
fugitive slave laws (and slavery itself).28 Unlike some of Lubet's lawyer and non-lawyer

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
1838,

Id. at 181, 202.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 213, 220.
See COVER, supra note 2.
ELIZABETH R. VARON, DISUNION! THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1789-1859 (2008).
See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield,Illinois,January 27,
in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108-15 (Roy P. Basler ed.,1953).

28. In some cases, Lubet seems to share their views, though to what extent is uncertain. He says that the

1851 Christiana rioters, who fought an armed battle with federal officials and slaveholders, "should more
accurately be called," in his words,"resistance fighters." LUBET, supra note 4, at 8. He praises alleged abettor

of the armed fugitives "Hanway's admirable assertion that [in the Christiana battle] the 'colored people had a
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protagonists, several of the judges who rejected such "higher law" claims against the
Fugitive Slave Act condemned the law but understood the necessity of accepting
punishment as the price of legitimate civil disobedience against immoral laws. 29 In our
republic, judges are not intended to serve either as priests or prophets, and we should be
thankful for this.
Lubet's broader historical argument that controversy over fugitive slavery had a
particularly important role in causing the Civil War is insupportable.30 The Civil War
was fought over the continuing spread of slavery, with which fugitive slavery had little to
do. Fugitive slavery was an irritant to the marginal members of the slave-state coalition,
and resistance to federal fugitive slave laws became an important symbol of the North's
unwillingness to let slavery continue as an institution. In the 1850s, the slave states were
about to lose irreversibly political control of the federal government, and that entailed
losing control over issues of far greater moment to them than the loss of a few thousand
slaves per year in a population of nearly four million slaves. As the course of
negotiations over the Crittenden Compromise after the 1860 election shows, issues such
as the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to California were far more influential
in the onset of war than southern fury over Northern nullification of the Fugitive Slave
Act. Fugitive slavery was a symbol to the South of what the North would do with
unchallengeable control of the federal government, not a significant cause of war in and
of itself.
Earl Maltz's book, Slavery and the Supreme Court, is a useful survey for general
readers of the legal history of slavery during the antebellum period. It includes generally
useful summaries of aspects of the period's political history. 31 Maltz takes a realistic
view of the Supreme Court's role in the politics of slavery before the Civil War. He
recognizes that the Court's slavery decisions had a marginal effect on the evolution of
slavery as a political problem and argues that in its decisions before 1850, the Court
sought to assist the nation's political leadership in avoiding sectional tensions.

right to defend themselves."' Id. at 124. He lauds defense lawyers in the Western Reserve case for their "new
and daring legal strategy of civil disobedience" that "challenged the moral legitimacy of the Fugitive Slave Act
and called upon the judge and jury to defy the law itself," saying that "they deserve great credit for exploring
such a radical approach to the trial" that "justified the rescue [by mob force] itself. Id. at 271. At other times,
he seems critical of such justifications (kidnapping charges in related case were "trumped up"). Id. at 314.
29. LUBET, supra note 4, at 217-18, 310-11.
30. Lubet claims that despite Southern outrage, in reality the fugitive slave laws were generally enforced,
with only an "occasional requirement of extended judicial proceedings." Id. at 8, 24-25. Since "extended
proceedings" could cost far more than the average value of a slave, as they quite probably did in the Bums
case, every slaveholder had to consider whether he might have to incur such costs. The estimated federal costs
of rendition in the Bums case alone were in range of $1,000,000 in today's dollars; without such help, court
action might well have been pointless. See LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN
THE MASSACHUSETTS COURTS, http://www.masshist.org/longroad/01slavery/bums.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2011) (listing the cost of Bums's rendition at $40,000 in 1854); MEASURING WORTH,
http://www.measuringworth.com/(last visited July 23, 2011) (for current value calculation). The New York
Times concluded in 1859 that "'right or wrong, the North will not suffer its [the Fugitive Slave Act's] operation
within its borders. . . . [Slaveholders think) the expense, trouble, odium, and risk of such endeavors far
outweigh the pecuniary value of the property."' EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY AND THE SUPREME COURT, 18251861 285 (2009).
31. These will sometimes benefit from supplementation. Compare DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE
SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY
253-95 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001), with MALTZ, supranote 3, at 119-35.
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Maltz also attempts to demonstrate that on many occasions before Dred Scott, 32
Justices were motivated by "neutral principles" in making decisions about the law of
slavery. In particular, he seeks to show that the basis of such decisions often relied upon
the Justices' views about issues such as federalism or the need for a "workable
accommodation" between the sections. 33 Before Dred Scott, most Justices agreed to
avoid divisive slavery questions unless it was absolutely essential to address them in
order to reach a decision. His account of cases such as Priggv. Pennsylvania takes issue
with the work of "neoabolitionists," including historians Paul Finkelman and the late
Don E. Fehrenbacher. 34 Maltz defends the Court's 1842 decision in Priggas an example
of such a "workable accommodation" approach based on the views that the Constitution
was intended to treat states as equals and that "Northerners would not work to undermine
the basic institutions of Southern society" despite the fact that he thinks it failed to
reduce sectional tensions or permit enforcement of the law. 3 5 He argues that a sea
change in the Justices' attitudes occurred only after the election of 1856, when
proslavery Justices united around an effort to "enshrine proslavery orthodoxy in the
fabric of constitutional law." 3 6 Maltz thinks this failed attempt showed the limits of the
Court's power to influence the direction of political change where a large part of the
public preferred a different policy.
Maltz's account of the Court's major slavery cases is clear and fair-minded. His
efforts to demonstrate that considerations other than slavery played a significant part in
the Justices' decision-making are often plausible, though one might disagree with the
force of his analysis in particular cases. Maltz's most interesting case analysis is his
lengthy treatment of Dred Scott v. Sandford, which occupies more than sixty pages. 37 He
thinks that the Court's decision to address the constitutionality of the Missouri
Compromise in this case was a misguided effort to restore sectional harmony by
resolving the dispute over slavery in the territories. 3 8 He attacks the Taney decision on
the merits, but defends it from a procedural perspective as not being dictum. 39 Maltz's
opinion that Justice Curtis's treatment of the legal history of the two major issues black citizenship and the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise - is
"unanswerable" is debatable, as readers of work by Mark Graber and Gerald Leonard
will know.4 0 This is an area where serious readers will want to dig much deeper.

32. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
33. MALTZ, supra note 3, at xix.
34. For an example of one of Fehrenbacher's classic account's, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED
SCorr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).

For another one of his important

works, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT TO THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001).
35. MALTZ, supra note 3, at xix, 301.
36. Id. at xxi.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id at 210-78.
See id at 244.
Id. at 264.
See GRABER, supra note 7; Gerald Leonard, Law and Politics Reconsidered. A New Constitutional

History of Dred Scott, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 747 (2009) (characterizing Justice Curtis's dissent as "an
unjudicial manipulation of the law . . . for the higher purpose of striking at the political hegemony of the

slaveholding class").
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Maltz criticizes Justice Curtis's Dred Scott dissenting opinion on several
grounds.41 However, he is mistaken, I think, to conclude that Justice Curtis's
"extraordinarily intemperate language" inviting Northerners to disregard the Court
majority's decision on the Missouri compromise issue was historically significant. 4 2
Lincoln and other Northern politicians were entirely ready to do that without Curtis's
help. They could succeed only because the Supreme Court already lacked cross-sectional
credibility on slavery extension issues, and this, in turn, was merely a reflection of the
Court's limited political influence over slavery since at least the time of the Missouri
Compromise.
Maltz also criticizes Justice Curtis for his unwillingness to accept as binding the
Missouri Supreme Court decision in Scott v. Emerson;4 3 this seems anachronistic. Had
Curtis done that and followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strader v.
Graham,44 this would have rendered his opinion on the constitutionality of the Missouri
Compromise dictum, politically isolating Justice McLean. Dred Scott would then have
lost on the merits even under Curtis's analysis. 4 5 In retrospect, both sides in Dred Scott
erred politically in thinking that the Court could lay the controversy over slavery
extension to rest on constitutional grounds, either by giving authority over it to Congress
as Curtis did or by denying Congress that power as Taney did. Congress had similarly
erred in thinking the issue could be laid to rest by an "evasive truce" in the Compromise
of 1850.46 The slavery extension struggle was destined to overflow permanently the
banks of the constitutional river.
This brings us to the underlying flaw in much of antebellum legal history on
slavery: the assumption that, at least where slavery extension was concerned, in a misty
golden past there was a workable rule of law or constitutional bargain, and that it broke
down before the Civil War (in Dred Scott, for example) because lawyers and judges
failed to do their job of protecting the rule of law against rising sectional political fervor.
This assumption is sharply at odds with the history of slavery in the early Republic. In a
federal republic such as ours, the rule of law requires an agreed-on final arbiter for legal
disputes and agreement on what authority is possessed by states versus that possessed by
the federal government. The Founders did not create a clear rule of law where slavery
extension was concerned, because they could not have agreed on one. This was not a
"moral failing" of the Revolution; it was an inevitable finesse required to build a federal
republican government strong enough to govern a continent in the face of sectional
divisions over slavery. The Missouri Compromise demonstrated that after 1820 in any
event, on the critical issue of slavery extension there was no workable rule of law. 4 7
Instead, in resolving the Missouri controversy, the sections created a political

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

MALTZ, supranote 3, at 263-66.
Id. at 263-265.
Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852); MALTZ, supra note 3, at 263.
Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82 (1850).
Id Strader's holding applied to both state and federal law.

46. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 664 (2005).
47. GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS' UNION:
SLAVERY, POLITICS,
CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 225-67 (2010).

HeinOnline -- 47 Tulsa L. Rev. 263 2011-2012

AND THE

264

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47:257

compact over slavery which maintained a tenuous sectional balance of power for several
decades, assisted by leaders' ability to form cross-sectional coalitions on other issues and
the division of newly acquired national territory between free and slave states. What the
slavery cases analyzed by Maltz demonstrate is the Supreme Court's ability to operate at
the margins of this sectional compact where slavery intersected with issues of wide
concern, such as uniformity in commercial law rules. However, the Court's one
particularly significant effort to intervene in the growing sectional dispute over extension
was predictably an abject failure because it had lacked the political authority and
legitimacy to bind the contesting parties on that issue for decades, no matter what it
decided. Consequently, the slavery decisions of the Supreme Court are not a major part
of the story of how the Civil War came to pass.
Antebellum historians should see the federal law of slavery for what it was in that
period - a peripheral influence on a far broader political and socioeconomic
controversy that, from the Revolution forward, had the potential to shatter the nation's
foundations. 4 8 Like the Missouri controversy, the Civil War was primarily a sectional
war between predominantly racist whites over political sovereignty and territorial
dominance during westward expansion that necessarily implicated slavery for
socioeconomic reasons; it was not principally a morally-driven struggle on either side.
Slaves and free blacks were its belated and incidental beneficiaries. 49 To understand that
controversy and to derive the proper historical lessons from the War itself, it is essential
that Americans not content themselves with reaching back anachronistically using
today's moral standards to condemn those who acted in reliance on and in support of
earlier constitutional decisions that we find morally reprehensible today. It is the coming
of the War that we still need to understand more fully, a task that extends far beyond
depicting the limited role antebellum law played in that deadly and tragic story.

48. For examples of such an approach, see WILENTZ, supra note 46, and Graber's attention to constitutional
constraints on political adjustment in his DredScott analysis, GRABER, supra note 7.
49. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 48.

HeinOnline -- 47 Tulsa L. Rev. 264 2011-2012

